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a b s t r a c t
Weather and climate extremes might propel adaptation both to a stable climate and its characteristic
extremes, as well as to underlying changes, if they reveal vulnerabilities, cause damage, and make slow
change more noticeable. In theory, extremes act as focusing events that overcome barriers to adaptation and
accelerate policy responses. This pace-making might be attenuated by uncertainty in interpreting trends, and
extremes might also miscue decision makers, perhaps pointing in the wrong direction or evoking over-
adaptation. Cases from a data-base of the most costly weather and climate extremes in the United States
over the past three decades are employed to develop a propositional typology of such pace-making effects.
Some adaptations in response to extremes result in reduced vulnerability, while other cases yield little
effective adaptation or hint at mal-adaptation. Even the most-extreme events do not necessarily yield
signiﬁcant adaptation, despite calls for change and explicit attribution to climate change.
& 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
For variety of reasons, extremes of weather and climate are
thought to propel adaptation to climate change (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, 2012; Füssel, 2007). In the simplest
formulation of this logical assertion, extremes make societal vulner-
ability manifest, and thus overcome widely-recognized (Adger et al.,
2007; Adger and Barnett, 2009; Moser and Ekstrom, 2010) social and
economic barriers to adaptation. The same effect is thought to hold
for a stationary climate, whereby extreme events override people's
tendency to disregard low probability, and thus infrequent, risks, and
adopt mitigations that were deferred during spells without damaging
events. Hazards managers have long counted on the “window of
opportunity” following occurrence of an extreme to propel mitiga-
tion (Birkland, 2006; Platt, 1999). For climate change per se, extreme
weather and climate events might transcend a hypothetical signal-
to-noise threshold and make climate trends evident to decision-
makers and, thus, elicit adaptation, or, at least, awareness of the need
for adaptation (Moser and Boykoff, 2013). An underlying trend in, for
example, mean temperature, may be difﬁcult for any decision-maker
to discern, but more frequent excursions into conditions rare, or even
unknown, in the past, especially if they cause acute impacts like heat
waves, make underlying climate trends more tangible. Framed by a
discourse on climate change, an extreme event becomes not just a
reminder that climate distributions have tails, but a harbinger of
increasing extremes.
Extremes have come to be framed descriptively as propelling
adaptation and prescriptively as useful signals that the climate is
changing and society should be adapting. It is postulated that
adaptation to extremes, even when not associated with climate
change, still serves to prepare society for climate change. The title
of an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change special report
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012), “Managing
the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate
Change Adaptation,” invokes this prescriptive role of extremes, in
addition to signaling a hypothesized “adaptation deﬁcit” that the
report uses to argue for hazard reduction actions now despite
large uncertainties about the future evolution of the climate and
its statistical tails.
Though intuitively appealing, experience and limited research
cast some doubt on these propositions. Our understanding
remains murky: extremes like Superstorm Sandy in the North-
eastern United States (Blake et al., 2013) and Australia's “Millennial
Drought” (Heberger, 2011), now routinely evoke increased
public discourse about climate change and climate adaptation
(Leiserowitz et al., 2012), yet theorists and practitioners alike still
struggle with the role of extremes in adaptation to either stable or
changing climate. Countervailing evidence includes cases of little
actual adaptation after repeated disasters (White et al., 2001), or
even the acceleration of trends that appear mal-adaptive (Kates
et al., 2006). This paper develops a typology of theoretical pace-
making effects of extremes in shaping adaptation to climate and to
climate change. It then explores case studies from a sample of the
most costly weather and climate extremes in the United States,
explicating these effects in a range of hazards and resource
management contexts.
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2. Pace-making theory and mechanisms
Adaptation to climate is, like other decision-making processes,
variously conceptualized depending on disciplinary perspective,
sector, and the divide between diagnostic and prescriptive analysis
(Adger and Barnett, 2009). But it can broadly be captured by a
small set of dimensions including anticipatory vs. reactive; auton-
omous vs. planned; individual vs. collective; and incremental vs.
transformative (Smit and Wandel, 2006; Kates et al., 2012; Jones
and Preston, 2011; Pelling, 2010). Less attention has been paid to
tactical aspects of adaptation; besides offering rosters of possible
adaptations in everything from water resources to international
security, the U.S. National Research Council in a recent assessment
cited a lack of, and called for more, research on processes of
adaptive decision-making and the timing of adaptive actions as
climate change unfolds (National Research Council, 2010). The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) ﬁfth assess-
ment report also calls for more attention to how adaptation is
implemented in response to climate risks (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, 2014); the IPCC and others (Patt et al.,
2010; Jones, 2001; Jones and Mearns, 2004) have speciﬁcally noted
the role of extremes in the adaptation process.
Ironically, extremes played a dominant role in the early climate
and society literature (Heathcote, 1985); initial work on climate
and history was mostly built on a range of extreme climate
episodes (Wigley et al., 1981). The pre-eminent historical case of
extreme events viewed as pacing adaptation in the U.S. was
recurrent drought on the Great Plains, illustrated by Warrick
(Warrick, 1975) in a graphic (Fig. 1), widely emulated and extended
in subsequent drought studies (Riebsame, 1991; Bowden et al.,
1981), illustrating how adaptation was stoked by each recurrent
drought. In current climate adaptation parlance this process might
be called learning loops (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 2012) or adaptation action cycles (Park et al., 2012), but
it can also be seen more prosaically as a ratchet effect.
The recent literature and hazards theory provides a range of
propositions for the pace-making role of extreme events in climate
adaptation (Table 1). Extremes might serve to ratchet autonomous,
even inadvertent, adaptation, without the necessity for any
decision-maker to explicitly recognize a worsening trend in
impacts. A more common framing viz. climate change is of
extremes as an alarm signal, convincing decision-makers that
(a) social systems are becoming more vulnerable, (b) natural
systems are becoming more extreme, or (c) both, and setting in
train purposeful and targeted adaptation. Extremes can damage
infrastructure and other forms of wealth and provide the “creative
destruction” opportunity for adaptation in the recovery and
reconstruction process, adaptation that in some formulations
would be accounted as reducing an existing “adaptation deﬁcit”
rather than preparing for future change. Finally, extremes may
evoke innovations in institutions and governance that, perhaps
already proposed by some analysts, were too innovative to be
adopted without some external pressure. These propositions are
next brieﬂy explored conceptually, and then are refracted through
a set of case studies.
2.1. Adaptive ratchet
The simplest pace-maker model is the ratchet, whereby indi-
viduals and systems add coping capacity, scaled to each extreme
event, so as to enlarge the coping range of the system at risk. For a
changing climate, this mechanism was implied in the adaptation
story-lines illustrated by Füssel (Füssel, 2007). Drawing on a
conceptual framework suggested by de Vries (1985), Füssel
(2007) laid out a hypothetical planned-adaptation time line
(Fig. 2) in which extreme events evoke actions that enlarge the
tolerance limits of a given resource system. Füssel describes a
hypothetical situation when a community experiences an extreme
(E1) outside the coping range:
The community wonders whether E1 is still an expression of
natural variability or whether it is already a harbinger of more
climate change to come. If the ﬁrst, the community would be
willing to accept the damage because the return period of a
similar event would be very long. If the second, the community
would prepare for costly extension of their coping range
because a previously “unusual” event like E1 would become
increasingly “normal” in the future (Füssel, 2007 p. 267).
Although the extended coping range is typically illustrated as a
permanent extension, experience suggests that physical and social
adaptations occasioned by extremes may also degrade over time,
slipping back toward the pre-event status. Variants of this graphi-
cal approach are used later in this paper to illustrate some of the
case studies.
In a ratchet effect, the enlarged coping range becomes a normal
part of the system, which can then absorb future extremes and
underlying climate change at a lower probability of failure. In
pacemaker theory, each event that appears to be consistent with
the assumed climate trend would act as a trigger to overcome
barriers to adaptation. Bigger events would yield more adaptation,
but the key difference is that the community which Füssel invokes
now assumes that the extreme is a signal of more to come. Thus
the community becomes more open to adaptive responses that
expand tolerance levels in the designated direction, and less
convinced by the assumption of climate stationarity. Furthermore,
the event-driven pattern of adaptation might quicken infrastruc-
ture replacement cycles, and, assuming that infrastructure most in
need of adaptation is more likely to be compromised or damaged
by extremes worsened by climate change, provides a de facto
prioritization of adaptive intervention, re-design, and shoring up.
This adaptation strategy could be seen as an informed, efﬁcient
“muddling through” (Lindblom, 1959): adaptation that is both
reactive and a bit forward looking, actuated more by acute impacts
and losses instead of anticipated loss of expected utility, but also
enjoying the option value to wait-and-see, while acquiring the
information and greater certainty of climate trends and risks that
comes packaged with extremes.
Fig. 1. An early illustration of the pace-making effect of extremes was used by
Warrick (1975) to identify adoption of speciﬁc responses to historic droughts in the
United States. In subsequent work (Bowden et al., 1981) Warrick and colleagues
extended the analysis back to the 1890s and forward to the 1970s, arguing that
even though different adaptations marked each drought episode, the net effect was
a lessening of societal impacts over time. Used with permission from the Natural
Hazards Center, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado.
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2.2. Alarm
A common assertion in the hazards literature is that extremes
act as an alarm that creates a “window of opportunity” for
adaptation and risk reduction; adaptations emerge most strongly
and most quickly after extreme events have revealed vulnerabil-
ities, including some that have worsened since the last event
(Birkland, 2006). This is sometimes referred to as the “pressure-
and-release” model in natural hazards research (Wisner et al.,
2003). In the climate change case, extreme events provide the
release from anti-adaptive pressure especially if they are linked to
at least weak belief in underlying climate change.
Such alarm signals, or “focusing events” (Rubin, 2012), not only
evoke action where delay had prevailed, but set in train adaptation
pathways that inﬂuence responses to threats for decades to come
(Birkland, 2006); a “policy acceleration” that has been documented
for ﬂood response in the U.S. (Platt, 1999) and the U.K. (Penning-
Rowsell et al., 2006). This policy acceleration is not always an efﬁcient
process for mitigating hazards stemming from a stationary climate,
and its efﬁciency in a non-stationary climate remains to be evaluated.
Birkland (1997) allowed that called-for adaptations do not always
materialize after catastrophes, and some that do rather quickly fade
as other, more routine pressures, such as demand for land develop-
ment in ﬂoodplains and on coasts, grows apace. The much antici-
pated “window of opportunity” for fundamental mitigation after
disasters sometimes remains unfulﬁlled in even the most destructive
events that would seem, by theory, to offer the largest impetus for
change (Kates et al., 2006; Christoplos et al., 2010).
Besides signaling that it is time to adapt, extremes might signal
the direction in which the climate is going. In a mode where
climate change is recognized, but has not yet risen to a threshold
where proactive adaptation is formalized in design standards and
professional and individual practice, adaptation would be acceler-
ated for each loss-inﬂicting event if it points in the direction of the
expected or perceived underlying change. Still, both technical and
lay decision-makers might understandably be puzzled by how to
respond to subtle signals of climate change just emerging from the
noise (Seneviratne et al., 2012), when uncertainty allows for
different interpretations of future trends (Leiserowitz et al.,
2012; Risbey, 2008). Scientiﬁc assessments and global modeling
results point in various directions; for example, parts of the globe
are likely to experience both more ﬂooding and more drought in a
warming world (Hansen et al., 2012). Whether technically accurate
or not, a run of extremes probably encourages perception that the
underlying climate is heading in a particular direction. Dramatic
hurricane impacts in the U.S. during 2004 and 2005 engendered a
notion that hurricanes are becoming worse and/or more frequent
due to climate change, though neither trend is unambiguous in the
landfall or magnitude data series for the region or globally
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012). Still, extremes
Table 1
Propositional inventory of pacemaker effects of extreme events.
Pacemaker effects
Ratchet effect Individual and collective reactions to series of extreme events accumulate into a net adaptation that temporarily or permanently
increases coping capacity for future climate change.
Alarm Extreme events reveal social vulnerabilities and exposures, thus increasing perceived risk beyond an action threshold. The extreme
may also bring attention to an underlying trend that was being ignored, and sets in motion purposeful adaptation tied to the trend.
Creative destruction Adaptations can be added more cheaply when infrastructure is repaired or replaced following a damaging event.
Creative innovation Extreme events evoke innovative institutional and technological responses, and previously-untenable options (e.g., like water sharing
among users) become more widely accepted.
Countervailing effects
Adaptive lag The barriers to adaptation, widely identiﬁed by adaptation researchers, may slow response to the point where the motivating effects
of the extreme fades.
Discounting extremes The signaling effect of extremes is attenuated by perceptual biases, economic discounting, and analytical tools that redeﬁne extremes
as part of “normalcy.”
Over-estimation of the
adaptation deﬁcit
The demand for additional adaptation may not be as great as some analysts believe. Tools for screening practicable “no regrets” or
“low regrets” options that are worth effecting even in the absence of climate change are poorly developed.
Mis-cueing and Mal-adaptation Rare events might actually confuse the sense of climate change, and mask trends. Extremes may point in the wrong direction, and can
trip premature adaptation. Some choices in extremis may exacerbate risks and vulnerabilities (e.g., build higher levees rather than
retreat from ﬂoodplain)
Fig. 2. An adaptation of Füssel's (2007) generic adaptation storyline (see also de Vries (1985)) illustrating both reactive and anticipatory adaptation that enlarges the
tolerance range for a climate-sensitive system.
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appear able to convince some decision-makers that change is under-
way, maybe even accelerating, and heading in the direction signaled
by the extremes (Adam, 2011; Editors, 2011).
Assuming that the extremes do indeed point in the right
direction (e.g., notable heat waves riding on an underlying warm-
ing trend; or storm surges riding on increasing sea level), then
each event-response couplet might evoke speciﬁc adaptations that
could reduce future impacts. This is a special form of reactive
adaptation because, if the extremes foreshadow conditions that
will become more common in future, the process also can be seen
as anticipatory. But rare events also have the potential to confuse
decision makers' sense of climate change, especially if they point
in the opposite direction than expected (a deep freeze during a
period of generally warming temperatures). This “mis-cueing”
effect represents one of the ways that extremes might fail to drive
adaptation efﬁciently.
2.3. Creative destruction
The challenge of divining which way the non-stationary
climate is heading for a particular place or set of climate factors
could yield an agnostic response is structured mostly by the most
concrete effect of extremes: physical damage. Thus it may be that
“creative destruction” will be the main adaptive mode in a
warming world for some time to come. The ocean-side residents
studied by Yohe et al. (1996) do not plan in anticipation of sea level
rise, yet are not immune to the physical impacts of storm surges.
Extremes force adaptation by destroying infrastructure and other
wealth, thus evoking re-construction during which the adaptation
deﬁcit is efﬁciently addressed, purposefully or incidentally, simply
because the relevant technology and practice, for everything from
houses to bridges to levees to waste water treatment plants, has
improved since the damaged facility was designed and built.
This effect is strongly evident in studies of infrastructure life-
cycle (Neumann and Price, 2009; Larsen et al., 2008; Kirshen et al.,
2008). In their study of Alaska infrastructure, Larsen et al. (2008)
show how repair or replacement of facilities damaged by extreme
events shortens the facility life cycle and, assuming that something
is done to accommodate the impact, the re-built facility is thus
better adapted to the changing conditions. Incorporating adapta-
tions to current and anticipated climate stresses not only at the
point of routine rehabilitation or replacement, but opportunisti-
cally when the system is damaged by extreme conditions, hastens
adaptation and reduces the long-term costs of climate change.
Of course such an adaptive strategy is more efﬁcient if the
direction of change is obvious and design changes during repair
at least marginally advance adaptation in that direction. But even
in the case of response to sea level rise, where the direction of
change is well-established, studies ﬁnd decision challenges at the
point where further protection is less efﬁcient than abandonment,
and in the timing of signiﬁcant infrastructural augmentations (like
new sea walls) which, given their costs, may be best delayed until
“just in time” to prevent inundation (Yohe et al., 1996; Neumann
and Price, 2009; Hallegatte, 2009; Yohe and Schlesinger, 1998;
Titus, 2011). Moreover, once large-scale infrastructure is in place,
path dependencies make alternative adaptation less likely (one
reason why Hallegatte (2009)) included reversible, ﬂexible and
shorter time horizons in his list of adaptation options in the face of
deep uncertainty). Of course, coastal communities lacking physical
protection from storm surges and facing accelerating sea level rise
may well envy those who, after some previous destructive event
(e.g., the 1900 Galveston Hurricane), marshaled the political,
economic, and technological will to build a sea wall, and only
have to up-grade it rather than go through an elaborate planning
and regulatory process, to get on the structural protection path.
The creative destruction mechanismworks for a non-stationary
climate only if decision-makers accept that a given event portends
worse or more frequent (or both) events in the future. Another
“100 year ﬂood” or “standard project hurricane” is not necessarily
cause for altering land use, especially if zoning and insurance
programs are already tied to it (Stakhiv, 2011). Hazard managers
might expect that worry about global warming will provide the
added momentum to ﬁx long-standing hazards vulnerabilities,
while climate change adaptation advocates expect that disasters
will convince society it must change because of the prospect for
worse in the future.
2.4. Creative innovation
It is logical to suppose that extreme conditions could evoke new
institutional arrangements that perhaps had been long-discussed but
were simply too difﬁcult to institute for political or other reasons.
Innovations forged under extreme conditions might serve as a
foundation for making hard decisions that better adapt resource
systems to climate change. This is one of the strong assertions of the
IPCC Special Report on Extremes (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, 2012), and some evidence for this emerges in the
case studies described below: water sharing pacts agreed under
extreme drought set the stage for greater ﬂexibility if the climate
becomes drier over time and droughts more frequent.
Ultimately, innovation would transition systems and commu-
nities from incremental to transformational adaptation (Kates
et al., 2012). The most fundamental transformations, such as
re-location or transitions to wholly new resource management
systems would presumably be slowest to emerge due to perceived
economic and social costs; the role of extreme events in transfor-
mative adaptation deserves more study.
3. Why extremes might fail to drive efﬁcient adaptation
The notion that extremes trip adaptation is countervailed by a
long-standing recognition of barriers and limits to adaptation.
Though adaptation behavior as postulated in the literature ranges
from severely constrained by cognitive limits (Parry et al., 2007) to
anticipatory (Yohe et al., 1996), most attention is on limits and
barriers (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010). It is widely assumed that
adaptation is a gradual process in which cognitive, technological
and political ﬁlters slow responses beyond the point of efﬁcient
expected utility, thus yielding a gap between theoretically optimal
and actual adaptation (Adger et al., 2007): the widely-invoked
“adaptation deﬁcit” assumed to exist even for the current suite of
weather and climate extremes. Adaptive lag is likely strongest in
the face of the most costly and transformative adaptation choices,
such as abandoning shoreline developments (Kates et al., 2012),
suggesting that a growing mal-adaptation will hold in many cases.
3.1. Adaptive lag
Yohe et al. (1996) postulated that individual or community
decision-makers would fail to respond to rising sea level efﬁciently
by either over- or under-investing (e.g., perhaps investing more to
protect property than likely returns would dictate, or abandoning
land too early). They predicted that under-investment would be
the more common response; the strong version of this hypothesis
is termed the “no-foresight” case, in which the decision-maker is
surprised by the impacts or simply ignores information about the
threat until the costs of continuing to do so become quite
burdensome, a behavior noted in the natural hazards literature
as early as the 1960s (Kates, 1962), and extensively documented
since (White et al., 2001; Kunreuther, 1996; Kunreuther and
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Michel-Kerjan, 2011). Yohe and colleagues write that “the no-
foresight case covers a more intuitive view of how the future
might unfold with coastal property owners maintaining their
structures to the bitter end” (p. 392 in Yohe et al., 1996). One
factor often posited as limiting adaptation is expectation of
government aid, which applies especially in coastal storm and
ﬂood cases and has been shown in the natural hazards literature to
dampen some mitigation behaviors (Kunreuther and Michel-
Kerjan, 2011; Burby, 2001; Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2007),
and could be counted as another “Moser-Ekstrom barrier” to
adaptation (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010).
Adaptive lag means that adaptation would lag climate change,
even in the face of extremes. Chhetri et al. (2010)) elaborate an
earlier (Schneider et al., 2000) farm adaptation model with a lag
factor that forces sub-optimal choices into their otherwise norma-
tive modeling. Speciﬁcally they cite farmers' difﬁculty in distin-
guishing a worsening climate trend from natural variability,
including the variability of the farmer's yield and income; this
puts a brake on adaptation. Researchers working in the framework
of resilience and socio-ecological systems have hypothesized that
resource systems marked by large variance (e.g., their statistical
distributions exhibit long tails) will be the slowest to adapt to an
underlying change. Coulthard (2009) suggested such a lag
mechanism in ﬁsheries in decline: “catches oscillate and this
may serve to relight hopes of a return to better incomes – a
reason to remain a ﬁsher, and to disagree with the perceived
crisis” (p. 263). The difﬁculty of reducing harvests and ﬂeets amid
ﬁshery declines, even with strong regulatory and compensatory
mechanisms, perhaps presages the challenges of encouraging
transformative adaptation to climate change in other activities
and sectors (Kates et al., 2012).
3.2. Discounting the extremes
Instead of viewed and assessed as warning of what is to come in
the future, extremes might be discounted, in two main ways: (a) via a
broad social and psychological discounting (Pidgeon and Fischhoff,
2011) whereby the notional interpretation of an extreme event is that
it is simply so rare and unlikely to occur again in the foreseeable future
that there is no point in doing things differently just because it
occurred; and (b) by a set of subtle, but pervasive, technical analytical
approaches developed and applied over decades in key ﬁelds like
water resources development, natural resources management, and
infrastructure design, that serve to discount the effect of extremes on
planning and adaptation. Stakhiv (2011) recently posited four key
biases against incorporating extremes and signiﬁcant future change in
water resources infrastructure planning, what he called the “quadruple
discount dilemma” (p. 1192): (1) wide application of the Log-Pearson
statistical distribution to calculate magnitude/frequency relationships
for ﬂoods and droughts that understates the tails of the distribution;
(2) economic discount rates that diminish both the calculated risk of
rare events and the value of up-front investments to deal with them
over long periods of time; (3) use of expected annual damages (the
probability of the event in any given year, which is by deﬁnition quite
small at the annual time step, multiplied by the losses it would cause);
and (4) optimization decision criteria requiring that projects be sized
to produce the greatest net national beneﬁts, which imposes a
macroeconomic efﬁciency not always consistent with efﬁcient or
desirable case-by-case risk reduction. Stakhiv (2011) calls for a new
family of water project decision rules that are more robust to future
changes.
Lack of action on natural hazard risks has also been explained as
resulting from a further complex of behaviors including distrust of
scientiﬁc information (White et al., 2001), short planning and invest-
ment horizons in both the private and public sector (Birkland, 2006),
and inaccurate interpretations of probabilistic information (Birkland,
1997; Pidgeon and Fischhoff, 2011). Recent work in behavioral
economics of hazards reveals a persistent under-insurance associated
with attenuation of risk perception during periods without events
(Kunreuther et al., 2013).
3.3. Over-estimating the adaptation deﬁcit
The prescription frequently offered that societies should better
adapt to current extremes as a ﬁrst step in adapting to future climate
change (often framed as low- or no-regrets options) implies an
inadequacy of current adaptation that, for reasons often left unspe-
ciﬁed in the literature, remains unﬁxed. The argument is that the
threat of future climate change ﬁnally provides the logic for closing
the gap between actual and optimal adaptation. But, attention to
extreme events may have led many observers to over-state this so-
called adaptation deﬁcit. The fact that extreme events cause sig-
niﬁcant loss does not necessarily reﬂect sub-optimal adaptation. Risk
management does not mean forcing all risks to zero. The logic for
hazard mitigation is that investments should yield a positive return
in reduced future losses, and since extremes are rare events with low
probability, the time-discounted losses simply may not support larger
investment in adaptation. The relationship between losses and
adaptation costs varies across probability and magnitude regimes.
Frequent, low magnitude events are either autonomously adapted to
over time or cause such small losses that they deserve little overt
adaptive effort. Moderately frequent and damaging events return
more positive loss reductions per unit of adaptation investment. But
low probability/high magnitude events, which cause large, infrequent
losses, may not justify signiﬁcant further adaptation investment,
especially expensive structural enhancements.
A proverbial caution thus foreshadows the down-side of the
“ratchet” and “alarm” pacemaker mechanisms: “act in haste,
regret at leisure.” Extreme events are, by deﬁnition, rare, and
spending large sums to protect against them does not always
make economic sense. The long spells between events mean that
the time-discounted beneﬁts (in this case: avoided future losses)
of major adaptations, like ﬂood or storm surge barriers, may not
outweigh the costs, including the opportunity costs of diverted
investments, like the signiﬁcant resources often needed for land
acquisition and construction of ﬂood protection works. The temp-
tation is to compare the costs of, say, a $15 billion storm barrier,
against a recent loss, say $40 billion from Superstorm Sandy and
reckon the beneﬁt-to-cost ratio an obvious winner. But the
characteristic structure of this particular decision under uncer-
tainty may mislead: the larger the event, the more likely it is to
trip adaptation, but the larger events are also less frequent.
Preventing such large, rare losses may not be worth it: the risk
calculus of probability, consequence and avoidance costs does not
always justify initial enthusiasms, as is dawning in discussions of
storm barriers for New York City (Fischetti, 2013; City of New York,
2013). Over time, a sober economic calculus might win out, as
might an equally sober engineering analysis, as it did following
Hurricane Katrina in southern Louisiana communities that settled
for shoring up the current hurricane protection system and
recognizing its limits and potential for failure (Committee on
New Orleans Regional Hurricane Protection Projects, 2009), rather
than up-grading it to control, in theory, a category 5 storm as some
leaders and citizens called for in Katrina's immediate aftermath.
3.4. Mis-cueing and mal-adaptation
Rare events may confuse the sense of climate change, mask trends,
or point in the wrong direction; extremes may even trip premature
adaptation and mitigation of the wrong risks. Surveys of public
perception of climate change suggest that people rather too easily
attribute extreme weather and climate events to climate change
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(Leiserowitz et al., 2012), raising the quandary that people might adapt
to climate change based on a scientiﬁcally incorrect reading of events,
that is, violating the care needed to make attribution (Adam, 2011;
Editors, 2011; Dole et al., 2011; Rahmstorf and Coumou, 2011).
Advocates might not care if people “do the right thing for the wrong
reason” but this is not a prescription for rationale adaptation.
Pre-climate change formulations of extremes-paced adaptation
entrained the potential for mal-adaptation, especially in the literature
on response to the ﬂood hazard (Platt, 1999; White, 1945). If the
adaptive response relied on further control efforts like dams and
levees, and those mitigations not only encouraged development of
the ﬂoodplain but could eventually be overwhelmed by an event in
the tail of the statistical distribution, then the adaptive response
could be making the problem worse (Harries and Penning-Rowsell,
2011). This is the “risk-spiral” envisioned in resilience theory (Folke
et al., 2010), occasionally applied to expected adaptation to climate
change (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2006).
Moreover, low- and no-regrets notions embody several implicit,
questionable assumptions about efﬁcient land and resource use, and
the role of risk in economic development (Hallegatte, 2011). The no-
regret prescription founders on a simple planning logic that would
question additional investment in adapting to current conditions that
appear destined to change signiﬁcantly in the near future in
unknown ways. This conundrum led Hallegatte (2009) and others
(New et al., 2011) to propose shortened planning horizons and
smaller, reversible investments as a strategy for adaptation to an
uncertain future, thus delaying transformative adaptation until the
nature of climate change further reveals itself. This could be framed
as an argument against using extremes to pace adaptation invest-
ments.
4. Cases: extremes-driven adaptation
Expression of the proposed pace-making effects can be dis-
cerned in actual cases of extreme weather and climate. Though
particular events have long provided case studies for climate
impact assessment, no common roster of case studies has yet
been developed to examine adaptation to extremes from the point
of view of climate change. Fortunately a new data base of extreme
events causing at least $1 billion in constant-dollar losses in the
United States has been developed by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration [NOAA; see (Lubchenco and Karl,
2012; Smith and Katz, 2013)]; the list is available at http://www.
ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events and can provide a common set of
cases to test notions of adaptive pacing and effectiveness. The data
base covers 151 events during 1980–2013, including episodes of
drought, ﬂoods, heat waves, hurricanes, and other extremes and is
built on consistent loss criteria and normalized for the time value
of money; it has been quality-checked and improved since it was
ﬁrst created (Lubchenco and Karl, 2012). Such a case study
approach does impose certain limits: the data-base is limited to
one place, a developed country, and tends to focus on individual
events, like hurricanes and tornadoes, that may not lend them-
selves to lessons for adaptation to climate per se. But the cases
provide empirical details not available in larger surveys or simula-
tion studies, and the cases examined here (Table 2) have been
selected to illustrate seasonal to multi-year events (except for 2011
Vermont ﬂood from Hurricane Irene, which is included because of
the explicit link to climate change adaption made by local
ofﬁcials), revealing responses that could be considered climate
adaptations and illustrating some of the pace-making mechanisms
posited here.
4.1. Flooding of the Great Salt Lake
The earliest case from the $Billion Events list taken up here can
be interpreted as an example of a miscue in response to a climate
extreme. Utah's Great Salt Lake, a terminal lake in the Great Basin,
rose to record levels in the early-1980s due to a multi-season spell
of wet weather and deep snowpack; the lake ﬂooded subdivisions
and damaged infrastructure. When in 1983 it began to threaten to
Table 2
Cases of extremes-driven adaptation drawn from NOAA's “Billion Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters” data-base.
Extreme Description Adaptations
1983 Western ﬂoods and
Great Salt Lake rise
Wet spell and heavy snowpack caused record high Great Salt Lake
level.
State of Utah built a $60 million pump and canal system to lower
the lake; the system was mothballed when the lake fell naturally.
1988 nation-wide Heat
Wave and Drought
Widespread drought: West (Yellowstone ﬁres); N. Great Plains (record
low wheat yields); Midwest (Mississippi barges aground); and
Southeast (Atlanta water supply crisis).
Scientist testimony links drought to global warming, but the event
provoked mostly short-term adjustments, like drought relief
legislation and water releases for barge trafﬁc. Federal wildﬁre
policy reverted to emphasize suppression, and Atlanta's effort to
conserve water worked well, but negotiations on its long-term
water supply failed to provide ﬁrmer resources.
1998 Northeast U.S. and
Quebec ice storms
Ice accumulation twice the previous record; multiple events in same
winter.
Vulnerability of critical systems manifest in widespread damage to
electricity grid, especially in Canada where the Nicolette Commission
cited the threat of future impacts as a reason to re-engineer the
system with more lines underground. A review 10 years later found
modest adjustments but not the major changes called for.
2002 Colorado River Basin
drought
Severe drought in Rockies and Upper Colorado River Basin; new
record low Lake Powell volume.
Conﬂict among basin states during the drought evoked historic new
policy on rules for sharing shortages between upper and lower
basin.
2004 Florida Hurricane
Season (Charley, Ivan,
Francis, and Jeanne)
Four hurricanes affected the state, causing and the most damaging
year in Florida's history.
Extreme losses raised concerns about property insurance, with
some arguing that changing exposure and hurricane climatology
was threatening the insurability of wind damage. The state of
Florida created its own insurance system to ﬁll the gap in the
insurance market.
2008 Iowa ﬂoods Widespread ﬂooding on tributaries to the Mississippi River in Iowa. Flooding was conceptually linked to global warming in state
reports, and signiﬁcant infrastructure re-location and ﬂood control
strengthening was implemented; a dramatic increase in agricultural
drainage also supported the notion that climate change¼more rain.
2011 Vermont ﬂoods
(Hurricane Irene)
Historic ﬂoods damage 300 bridges, 1000 culverts, and thousands of
miles of roadway.
The Vermont department of transportation proposed revision of its
handbook for sizing hydraulic infrastructure, with an explicit plan
to accommodate bigger events in future expected due to climate
change.
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inundate the international airport and a major interstate highway,
two key economic lifelines, the state invested $60 million in a
pumping scheme that would, for the ﬁrst time ever, provide
control of the upper ranges of lake levels (Morrisette, 1988a,
1988b). The lake, however, fell naturally just after the pumps
began operating and has not risen back to threatening levels
(Fig. 3). The pumps were mothballed.
Although the policy discussions leading to the Great Salt Lake
pumping scheme conveyed uncertainty whether high lake levels
would subside, as they have in the historical record, or become a
long-term trend (Morrisette, 1988), the problemwas not framed as
climate change per se, reﬂecting the limited attention paid to the
issue in the early 1980s. Little in the historical record suggested
that the lake levels would continue rising and stay elevated, but
the risk was deemed too great by decision-makers facing unpre-
cedented conditions.
4.2. Nationwide drought, 1987–89
Four years after Great Salt Lake levels peaked, another $Billion
Event, a continental-scale heat wave and drought, evoked explicit
linkage between global warming and increasing heat and dryness
when climate scientist James Hansen made the connection in
testimony to the U.S. congress (Hansen, 2009). The city of Atlanta
had declared a water emergency, barges were running aground on
the Mississippi River, Great Plains croplands were desiccated, and
the Yellowstone National Park region was beset by wildﬁres
(Riebsame et al., 1991). Hansen testiﬁed, on a hot late-June day
in Washington, DC, that the greenhouse effect was sufﬁciently
large to affect the probability of summer heat waves like the one
on-going, and the New York Times reported the next day that
“global warming has begun, expert tells senate” (Schneider, 2009).
The drought deepened as the summer wore on and the link
between it and global warming ﬂavored discussions from
Washington hearing rooms to North Dakota wheat ﬁelds (Diggs,
1991). The drought thus earned a place in the annals of global
warming science and discourse. It also occasioned some adaptive
responses, but with mixed results. Atlanta engaged in a unsatis-
factory negotiation for new water storage arrangements in the
large federal reservoir it drew on, and found itself in an even
worse water shortage emergency during the next drought, in
2003. The 1988 wildﬁres in iconic Yellowstone National Park and
vicinity set back federal efforts to let some ﬁres burn, especially in
natural areas, to reduce the build-up of fuel. Thus forest and
wildﬁre policy in the U.S. was accelerated further down the path of
aggressive ﬁre suppression, fuel build-up, and worsened ﬁres
(Pyne, 2013; van Wagtendonk, 2007). Despite these renewed
efforts to ﬁght ﬁres, area burned continued to grow (Stephens
and Ruth, 2005). On the adaptive side of the ledger, the drought
set the stage for a new drought monitoring and assessment system
in the U.S., the National Integrated Drought Information System
(NIDIS; see www.drought.gov).
4.3. The ice storms of winter 1997–98
A case of creative destruction in the $Billion Events data base was
associated with a series of ice storms in the Northeast U.S. and Quebec
during the winter of 1997–98. The event caused $1.2 billion insured
losses (in 1998 dollars), left 5.2 million people without power in
Canada and the U.S. for weeks to months, and not only starkly
revealed the vulnerability of extensive aerial electricity transmission,
but literally brought parts of the system crashing to the ground. The
most obvious adaptation, recommended by the “Nicolet Commission”
that analyzed the event and proposed adaptations for the Quebec
provincial government (Commission scientiﬁque et technique chargée
d'analyzer les événements relatifs à la tempête de verglas survenue du
5, 1998), was the undergrounding of more power lines. Subsequent
assessments of the costs of doing so reduced the appeal of that
adaptation and the system was restored mostly as it was before the
event. Interviewed on Canadian television ten years after the event,
commission chair Roger Nicolet offered a mixed report on efforts to
make the electricity and associated systems less susceptible. But, the
chance to up-grade the system with new technology apparently did
make it less vulnerable: a study by RMS, a catastrophic risk modeling
group, found evidence that a variety of ﬁxes worked into the system in
Quebec and the northeastern U.S. as it was repaired, including
especially routing redundancy, smart monitoring and hardening some
key poles and towers, along with resilience built into how local
systems tap into regional distribution, have made the overall system
less susceptible to widespread disruption under similar conditions
(Risk Management Solutions, 2008).
4.4. Drought and the Colorado River
Creative innovation occurred in response to extreme drought in
the Colorado River basin that began in 2000, peaked in 2002 and
helped push through a long-discussed reform of the allocation of
ﬂows ensconced in the 1922 river compact and subsequent
policies, referred to collectively as the “law of the river.” The
conﬂict was mainly over how water shortages were to be allocated
Fig. 3. A Füssel diagram depiciting the adaptation storyline for ﬂooding of the Great Salt Lake. Unprecendented water level rise in the early-1980s threatened critical
infrastructure, and managers had to decide whether to attempt to control the lake or hope that the level would recede naturally. Little in the historical record suggested that
the lake levels would stay elevated, but the risk seemed too great and a pumping system was constructed. The lake receded below the pump intake level soon after the
system became operational, and it was mothballed.
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between the upper and lower basin states. The basin is divided at a
point in between its two main reservoirs, Lake Powell and Lake
Meade. Long-standing rules setting amounts of water to be
released past this point were for “normal” and “surplus” years,
not dry years. After Lake Powell ﬁlled in the 1970s (Fig. 4), large
ﬂows, including the record runoff in 1983 that elevated the Great
Salt Lake and caused large ﬂood control spills from the reservoirs,
circumvented conﬂict over shortages. Drought in the late 1990s
raised some concerns and inter-state concern about allocations,
but eased in time to avoid crisis. More serious drought starting in
2000 ﬁnally tripped concerns and raised the potential for litigation
among the water users. It took a few years for the drought to result
in depressed storage levels and at the low point, in 2005, the
Secretary of the Interior called for negotiations among the users on
shortage management, setting a fast-track deadline for agreement
in less than two years in order “to make informed operational
decisions if the reservoirs continued to decline” (Secretary of
Interior, 2007 p. 1). The “record of decision” (ROD) signed by the
Secretary of the Interior in late 2007, stated
The Colorado River Basin (Basin) is in the eighth year of
drought – the worst eight year period in over a century of
continuous recordkeeping. Reservoir elevations have declined
over this period and the duration of this ongoing, historic
drought is unknown. This is the ﬁrst long-term drought in the
modern history of the Colorado River, although climate experts
and scientists suggest droughts of this severity have occurred
in the past and are likely to occur in the future (Secretary of
Interior, 2007, p. 1)
The new guidelines are complex, but better balance upper and
lower basin supplies in a drought, and set the ﬂoor for Lake Powell
releases to meet lower basin needs at 5.93 million acre feet. The
environmental impact statement (EIS) for the guidelines hints that
such conditions might be more frequent in the future, but only
brieﬂy alludes to climate change. In a technical appendix, a team of
climate scientists analyzed reservoir operations under the new
shortage guidelines through 2057 with a hypothetical 20% decline
in ﬂows due to climate change, ﬁnding that the new rules reduced
the risk of reservoir depletion (Rajagopalan et al., 2009). Thus,
though climate change was not explicitly invoked in the Secre-
tary's order, the adaptation appears to reduce the system's
vulnerability to climate change as well as episodic drought, and
the 2000–2005 dry spell appears to have tripped this adaptation.
4.5. Florida's summer of hurricanes 2004
Florida's 2004 hurricane season, in which four storms hit or
severely affected the state, heightened worries among insurers
and government regulators that the hurricane risk was escalating
and may become un-insurable, worries made worse the following
year when Hurricane Katrina caused a roughly $40B insurance
payout in Louisiana and Mississippi. Hurricanes are listed sepa-
rately in the $Billion Events data base but several analyses have
suggested that, together, the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons
were interpreted as a signal that hurricane intensity and fre-
quency, along with damages, were increasing (Mooney, 2007).
Germane to the pacemaker effect, the 2004–05 losses were
interpreted by the insurance industry as a sign of worsening
effects due to global warming (Schmidt et al., 2009), which, along
with adverse exposure, was making premiums and coverage pools
inadequate (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2007). Subsequent
actions by companies and state regulators in Florida, still being
studied by researchers at this writing, led to concerns about the
viability of homeowners' insurance in the state, with potentially
large increases in premiums and reductions in coverage, and,
ﬁnally, creation of a state-chartered insurance agency to ﬁll the
gap. A series of reports by the Sarasota, Florida, Herald-Tribune
(St. John, 2010) suggested that the insurance industry may have
over-reacted to the 2004–05 losses, and that the risk modeling was
too sensitive to extreme seasons, given ambiguous evidence that
such hurricane seasons were becoming more likely. Kunreuther and
Michel-Kerjan (2011) expressed concerns that the state's interven-
tion would expose taxpayers to future loss burdens and needed to
be re-considered (p. 57). At this writing a fair assessment might be
that the interaction of property exposure, hurricane climatology,
and insurance theory are complex and that it is unclear what
lessons for adaptation should be gleaned from a hurricane season
like 2004 in Florida.
4.6. Midwest ﬂoods 2008
Antecedent wet conditions, followed by heavy rains in 2008,
brought ﬂooding centered in Iowa that seems to have acted as an
Fig. 4. The volume of water stored in Lake Powell on the Colorado River illustrates the effects of wet and dry spells. After the reservoir ﬁrst ﬁlled in the 1970s a record runoff
caused large ﬂood control spills in 1983. A subsequent dry spell in the 1990s, along with growing use especially in the lower basin (below Lake Powell), highlighted the lack
of ﬁrm rules for sharing shortages in the long-standing inter-state agreements called the “law of the river”; the dryness eased in time to avoid a crisis. The next drought, in
2002–05, brought crisis, forcing the federal government to start negotiations on shortage management, and yielding a ruling in 2007 that allocates shortages between the
upper and lower basins, including tiers for Lake Powell releases down to 5.93 million acre feet to meet lower basin needs.
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alarm and directional signal, passing a threshold where state
ofﬁcials began to accept that climate change was causing Iowa's
climate to get wetter (Iowa Climate Change Impacts Committee,
2011). Previous high water events, most notably the historic 1993
ﬂooding (which was exceeded in 2008), did not evoke an evident
sense of climate change; at least one ﬁnds little mention of climate
change nor of climate adaptation in reports associated with the
1993 ﬂoods; see, for example, (Changnon, 1996). After 2008,
though, several key facilities, many damaged by the ﬂoods, were
moved out of the ﬂoodplain with an explicit justiﬁcation that
ﬂoods appeared to be more frequent and larger due to climate
change (Iowa Climate Change Impacts Committee, 2011).
It appears that two unprecedented ﬂoods within 20 years, the
latter more framed by a discourse on global warming possibly
worsening precipitation extremes, made the 2008 event appear to
be a signal of climate change. The notion was strengthened when
environmental organizations released reports citing Iowa as a
target for climate change (Petroski, 2012). A trend among Iowa's
farmers also seems to reﬂect increasing wetness: “tiling” of
agricultural ﬁelds to reduce soil water logging (Singh et al.,
2009) grew markedly, and it could be that this individual and
rural adaptation provides some support for ofﬁcials to be more
explicit about climate change, with an extreme event highlighting
the problem and presumably pointing toward future risks.
4.7. Tropical storm Irene rains
Climate change was explicitly invoked in the State of Vermont's
plans for recovering from ﬂooding associated with Tropical Storm
Irene in 2011. Flooding damaged over 2000 roadway segments,
washed out 1000 culverts, and damaged 300 bridges, with losses
still not fully accounted for at this writing. The state's department
of transportation noted that
It is recognized that in some cases undersized bridges and culverts
played a role in the amount of damage experienced during Tropical
Storm Irene. The primary guidebook that engineers use for sizing
bridges and culverts on public highways is the Vermont Agency of
Transportation's Hydraulics Manual published in 1998. The princi-
ples of the manual are founded on risk management associated
with various ﬂood levels and statistical analysis of Vermont's
historic precipitation data. Since its publication, designers are
now considering additional factors not documented in the manual.
These include climate change and its inﬂuence on precipitation
frequency and volume…. (Irene Recovery Coordination Team, 2011,
p. 52).
The state's chief transportation engineer argued that
Understanding that our climate is changing and that the frequency
and intensity of storm activity will likely be greater during the next
100 years than it was during the last 100, it is prudent that as we
rebuild we also adapt. But doing so successfully will not be
easy………The time has now come, however, to consider building
longer bridges with foundations that sit outside our river channels,
even if these bridges cost more and have a longer footprint (Irene
Recovery Coordination Team, 2011, p. 56)
But, as in post-Katrina New Orleans (Kates et al., 2006),
pressure to return systems to normal and to quickly reopen
Vermont's roads and bridges militate against the sort of re-sizing
and reconﬁguration that the chief engineer has in mind. Some
time is needed to observe if and how this explicit plan for adapting
is implemented. Similar ﬂooding due to decaying tropical storms
in the 1950s, and record ﬂoods to the south, in Pennsylvania,
associated with decaying Hurricane Gladys in 1972, did not
occasion a discussion of climate change nor of a need to revise
ﬂood standards.
5. Discussion
This preliminary sampling from a data base of extreme weather
and climate events in the U.S. yields mixed results: some adapta-
tions in response to extremes appear to result in reduced vulner-
ability, but other cases yield little effective adaptation or even hint
at mal-adaptation. In some cases, despite growing alarm, the
evidence is too ambiguous to guide a transformation of adaptation
policy. This ﬁrst pass through the list suggests the value of more
systematic analysis of recent extremes and of policy responses as
part of the growing research effort to track and predict the
effectiveness of climate adaptation.
The cases suggest a few overarching themes. The pacemaker
effect might hold for both individuals and institutions in which
they are embedded. Extremes might occasion policy and other
programmatic changes that accumulate into collective adaptation
that then compels individual adaptation (Arnell et al., 1984). In a
sense, individual decision-makers could be forced to adapt even
without recognizing change if they are embedded in social
instrumentalities (e.g., large ﬂood control systems, building codes,
insurance systems, and engineering standards) that exogenously
alter the legal, economic, or physical conditions of their land and
resource uses. One event in the NOAA list of $Billion weather and
climate extremes, Hurricane Andrew in southern Florida, is widely
acknowledged to have driven improved building codes that then
mitigated future losses. Neumann and Price (2009) argued that
centralized up-grades of building codes, engineering practices, and
other policies affecting the built environment and land use, could
accelerate adaptation above what individuals would chose to do,
though they also recognized that property owners and investors
often resist new requirements that add costs. Yet, while program-
matic changes have the potential to effect substantial adaptation,
institutionalized adaptations to current climate, such as the very
ﬂood plain policies set in motion by past extremes, are often
viewed as a barrier rather than aid to adaptation (Moser and
Ekstrom, 2010; National Research Council, 2010). Similarly, profes-
sional practice and policy might slow adaptation in some sectors,
as Stakhiv (2011) has argued for water resources, so the net effect
of extremes on larger policy structures remains ambiguous in the
literature, with the hint that even a strong signal does not
necessarily ratchet policy adaptation.
A pacemaker model of adaptation must still contend with the
distinction between incremental and transformative adaptations
(Kates et al., 2012). Enlarging infrastructure incrementally within a
life-cycle process applies mostly to built things, and less to land,
location or natural resources, and one of the hardest choices that
people make is to change location and/or occupations and
resource systems, not just because of attachment to place, but
because of the non-fungible nature of land-based occupations
(Marshall et al., 2012). The main mechanism by which most land
owners move (either their residence or business) to another parcel
is by selling the one they occupied previously – an option that
might be extinguished, or at least severely discounted, by some
climate change effects. It is possible though, that the transaction
costs could be obtained by selling the current land for a different,
maybe adaptive use (e.g., a shoreline residential parcel is sold to a
land conservancy to be restored to active dunes that provide
resistance to future storm surges; or the uses of dry land are
changed to match the wetland characteristics that the parcel has
taken on). In this way, incremental adaptation, even if tripped by
extreme events, blends into transformational adaptation, about
which much less has been written (see Kates et al., 2012).
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Does the pacemaker model harbor the potential for mal-
adaptation? Might we adapt in the wrong direction, or make
things worse as we try to make them better? Much could go
wrong. To be a useful guide to adaptation, extreme events must
accurately signal the underlying, cumulative trend that is exacer-
bating those events (in frequency and/or magnitude). Yet path
dependencies may hold in many cases: once the adaptive pathway
is levees, then the response to increasing ﬂooding, is often more
and higher levees. That response might be able to maintain an
acceptable level of safety, as envisioned in the Füssel diagrams, but
eventually the situation comes to look like the prescriptive frame
developed in sea level rise impact studies (Yohe et al., 1996),
where protection investments stop making sense when the
marginal increment of additional protection is more costly than
the property protected or than the cost of strategic abandonment.
Given the momentum of hazard policy paths, we would not expect
a correction (e.g., to re-location) precisely at the point of balanced
marginal costs and losses, but somewhere well into increasing net
loss. Yohe et al. (1996) suggested that “since protection decisions
will likely be made at a local level where the political pressures
brought might be most powerful, these components could lead to
economically inefﬁcient but socially and/or politically prudent
efforts to protect coastline that the economic cost calculus would
say should be abandoned” (p. 391).
Finally, extremes are episodic and irregular, hardly the ingre-
dients for thoughtful, strategic adaptation. Recent analyses of (and
debates over) attribution of extreme events to climate change
(Dole et al., 2011; Rahmstorf and Coumou, 2011) reveal that events
that could easily be once-in-a-lifetime experiences for those
involved do not unambiguously signal trends, nor necessarily
convince decision-makers that they are experiencing climate
change or are already in a fundamentally different climate. And
of course, trends signaled by extremes may not accurately fore-
shadow the future climate; the potential for mis-cueing would
seem quite large, and false positives must be accounted for in any
analysis of, or prescription for, the pacing effect of extremes.
Especially in the earth's naturally noisy climate system, the rariﬁed
statistical realm of extremes would seem a poor place to look for
signals by which adaptation policy might be guided.
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